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Abstract
Evidence is shown, using US foreclosure data by state 1975–93, that periods of high
default rates on home mortgages strongly tend to follow real estate price declines
or interruptions in real estate price increase. The relation between price decline and
foreclosure rates is modelled using a distributed lag. Using this model, holders of
residential mortgage portfolios could hedge some of the risk of default by taking
positions in futures or options markets for residential real estate prices, were such
markets to be established.

In a previous paper (Case, Shiller and Weiss, 1993) we argued that there is a need for
a liquid, national hedging market in real estate prices. We proposed futures and options
markets that are cash settled based on indices of city or region residential real estate prices.
Individual homeowners are the largest bearers of residential real estate risk, and they
have the most to gain from hedging in such markets. Homeowners are for the most part
highly leveraged and undiversified. However, while hedging would provide great benefits
to homeowners, most are unsophisticated financial managers, certainly unaccustomed to
using derivative markets.
The likely reluctance of homeowners to make use of hedging markets represents an
obstacle to their establishment. It is more likely that homeowners would use riskmanagement services that were offered to them by retailers who present the services in
attractive packages and who market them appropriately. If liquid markets for real estate risk
existed, then one might expect to see eventual development of such retailers who would then
*
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use the futures and options markets to lay off the risk they acquire from selling these
services. Some possible retail institutions, and their relation to hedging markets, are
described in Shiller and Weiss (1994).
Unfortunately, the development of such a symbiotic relationship between retailers of
market hedging services and futures markets may be slow to develop, since each party in the
relationship needs to see the other already developed before rapid growth can occur. But
this obstacle to the establishment of futures markets may not be serious if there are yet
others who stand individually ready to use the futures markets now, so that the markets
could gain an initial foothold serving them.
One group that may be ready now to use hedging markets in real estate price risk is
holders of portfolios of mortgages. The values of their portfolios depend on collateral
values, that is, on the current price of the mortgaged real estate.
In this paper we will present evidence that the value of mortgage portfolios does depend
importantly on risks of price change in real estate markets, so that mortgage holders ought
to have a strong incentive to hedge. Risks are negligible when aggregate prices are increasing rapidly, become substantial when aggregate prices level off for a few years, and become
severe when aggregate prices fall.
To accomplish this, we first develop a model of the relation of mortgage defaults to
citywide real estate prices. Next, after a brief review of the empirical literature, we examine
foreclosure data (for the fifty states) and house price indexes, as well as other economic
variables, in an effort to produce a predictive model of losses due to mortgage default. The
results give some suggestions about how holders of mortgage portfolios might hedge in the
proposed real estate futures and options markets.

Mortgage Holders as Option Writers
Those who invest in mortgages are in effect writers of two kinds of options, call options on
long-term debt and put options on real estate prices. The call option on long-term debt
arises from the prepayment option in the mortgage contract, which the mortgagor has an
incentive to exercise should interest rates fall (long-term bond prices rise). The put option
on real estate arises from the option the mortgagor has to default altogether on the mortgage.
In non-recourse states, like California and Texas, this option is guaranteed by law. In other
states, the mortgagor does not technically have this option, but in practice lawsuits seeking
deficiency judgments against non-real estate assets of defaulting mortgagors are few in
number. By comparison with options on, say, corporate stocks, these options are somewhat
unconventional, but they are fundamentally no different.
One might think that investors who hold mortgages should eliminate the risk of the
2

option investment by purchasing interest rate call options and real estate put options. Doing
this would seem to cancel out the risk that they incurred in writing the options. However,
the matter is not so simple since the owner of a portfolio of mortgages holds in effect a
portfolio of options with different strike prices; a portfolio of options is not the same thing
as an option. Moreover, the mortgagors will not exercise their options with anything like
the predictability of holders of financial options. So, there is no natural reason for hedgers
to favor the options market for hedging over the futures market. They could use a dynamic
hedging strategy, adjusting their hedges in either the futures or options markets in ways that
will be discussed below.
Because of the nature of the prepayment option, a mortgage is an option with not a
single strike price and single exercise date, but a schedule of strike prices and exercise dates,
that schedule determined by the schedule of amortization of the mortgage (see Chinloy,
1991). This option is related to interest rate risk, rather than real estate price risk, since
prepayments occur primarily when interest rates decline. However, the option is not as
simple as an option on an interest-bearing vehicle. Because of liquidity constraints, those
mortgagors who are liquidity constrained due to a fall in the value of their property may find
themselves unable to prepay, since the value of their property has fallen below the mortgage
balance.
Those who manage portfolios of mortgages already have learned to hedge, to the extent
that prepayments are determined only by interest rate movements, both the interest rate risk
and the prepayment risk in the long-term interest rate futures and options markets. In fact,
the very first interest rate futures market (established in 1975), the GNMA (Government
National Mortgage Association) bond futures market, was a market was for prepayment risk
as well as interest rate risk. A GNMA bond is a pool of mortgages that is guaranteed against
default by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, so that there is no default risk.1
But the bearer of the bond does bear all of the prepayment risk. The GNMA futures market
was very active, until problems in its delivery procedure caused this market to be supplanted
by the Treasury bond futures market.2
The disappearance of the GNMA futures market in no way indicates the disappearance
of demand to hedge the prepayment risk. The hedging can be done on other existing
markets, since prepayment is determined fairly well by levels of interest rates, given other
information about the mortgage pool. That holders of mortgage-backed securities are in
1

Default risk does exist in these bonds only in the sense that when default occurs the mortgage is
prepaid by GNMA; it thus translates into some prepayment risk.
2

The GNMA futures market lost out eventually to the treasury bond futures market apparently
because the delivery option in the GNMA contract made the futures price a poor hedge against the risk
of prepayment for the representative mortgage based security; see Johnston and McConnell (1989).
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effect writers of options on interest rates is well known in the industry, and theories of
hedging mortgage-backed securities rely on the theory of such options.3
If there were a futures market in real estate prices, this hedging behavior could be
refined to take account of the effects of real estate price movements on prepayment. This
would be a sort of fine tuning of the hedging of mortgage risk, and is not our primary
concern here. We turn to a discussion of hedging the effects of default on mortgage investments.

Theory of Defaults and Hedging
Strong evidence, discussed below, shows that the best single predictor of default is the
current loan-to-market value ratio of each property. This suggests that as prices fall, the
probability of defaults will rise. Unfortunately, the cost to lenders of default also rises as
prices fall. While default probabilities and default losses rise with falling prices, default
losses will rise non-linearly and faster than the decline in house prices. Such a dynamic
means that the mortgage holder would ideally want a non-linear, or dynamic, hedge. In this
section we derive a nonlinear model that indicates how dynamic hedging should proceed.
Let us first agree on some notation; we will follow the notation of Case and Shiller
(1987). Household i buys a house at time ti, the (log) price of the house at time t is Pit. We
suppose that the (log) house price is the sum of three components:
Pit ' Ct % Hit % Nit

(1)

where Ct is the log of the citywide level of housing prices at time t, Hit is a Gaussian random
walk (where Hit has zero mean and variance H2 that is uncorrelated with Ct), and Nit is a
time-of-sale house-specific random error (which has zero mean and variance N2 for all i and
is serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with Ct and Nit at all leads and lags), due to
unpredictable noise in the sales process. This model imposes a beta of one with respect to
the city-wide house price level for all houses, an assumption that could be relaxed.
Suppose that the house is financed with a fixed-rate mortgage. The (log) mortgage
balance is Mit. Mit as a function of time t is determined by a schedule specified at time ti that
depends on the mortgage rate and the length of the mortgage.
The risk of default is related to the (log) loan-to-value ratio Lit = Mit – Pit, and is related
as well to a vector Xit of other economic conditions that affect default, such as

3
For example, Toevs (1985) defines a concept of “option-adjusted duration” to allow hedging of
prepayment risk in interest rate markets.
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unemployment rates. Note that there is a hazard of default even if Lit is negative; though as
it becomes large and negative the hazard tails off towards zero.
Our model says that the probability pit of defaulting at time t for house i is a nonlinear
function:
pit ' f (Lit , Xit).

(2)

It is important that we represent the function as nonlinear, since with very low values of Lit
there will be virtually no defaults. A hypothetical example of such a function is plotted in
Figure 1 for a given value of Xit. Note that for very negative values of the log loan to value
ratio the function approaches zero; virtually no one would want to default in these circumstances. As the loan-to-value ratio grows, the probability of default becomes higher and
higher. The probability that a house is in foreclosure never reaches 1.00, since the
foreclosure process does not happen immediately, and because the foreclosure is ended after
some time. Because the function is nonlinear, the cross-sectional variance of house prices
matters for aggregate portfolio behavior, as we shall see.
We seek now to describe the relationship between the change in value of a portfolio of
mortgages on houses and the price level Ct for the city in which the house is situated. For
this portfolio, we have a list of the dates of mortgage origination for each property, and
hence a specification of the function Mit for each property. The probability that property i
will go into foreclosure over the relevant time period is:
pit ' f (Mit & (Ct & Ct % Hit & Hit ) & Pit , Xit).
i

i

i

(3)

Note that value of the time-of-sale error Nit does not affect the default decision, since we
have assumed that it is not known to the homeowner until the house is actually sold. Now,
the example shown in Figure 1 was drawn for a given specific value of the vector Xit; we
hypothesize that varying elements of Xit will shift the curve shown in Figure 1 to the left or
right, without affecting its basic shape. An owner of a mortgage portfolio with information
about the selling prices, mortgage terms of the underlying properties, and the values of Xit
still does not know the relation of pit to the city price Ct because the house-specific noise
component Hit & Hit is not known. Fortunately, our Gaussian model of the variance of
i
changes in H allows us to calculate the functional relationship between average losses due
to foreclosure F and the city-wide price level Ct . Suppose, for a simple example, that all
houses in a portfolio were purchased by the mortgagors on the same date ti at the same log
price Pit , have identical schedules Mit, and identical vectors Xit of economic conditions
i
affecting default, and that the properties are otherwise randomly selected. Then the
5

expected fraction F of properties in foreclosure at time t is:
F '

%4

m&4

f (Mit & (Ct & Ct % t & t i s) & Pit , Xit) n H(s)ds.
i

i

(4)

where nH(s) is the normal density function with mean zero and variance H2. Moreover,
assuming that the expected loss to the mortgagee given that the property defaults (taking
account of the distribution of the time-of-sale noise term Nit) is given by the function V(Mit
– Pit, Xit), the expected average loss in the portfolios due to foreclosure is:
E '

%4

V(Mit & (Ct & Ct % t & t i s) & Pit , Xit)
i
i
m&4
× f (Mit & (Ct & Ct % t & ti s) & Pit , Xit) nH(s)ds.
i

(5)

i

The above equation can then be used to define the positions in futures or options markets
to hedge the risk of losses due to mortgage default. In practice, of course, where portfolios
are not so uniform, one would have to expand the analysis to take account of the joint
distribution of purchase dates, purchase prices, and economic conditions.
The same analysis as represented by equation (4) can allow us to compute the empirical
relationship between foreclosures in a geographical area, such as a state, and the variables
that determine overall foreclosures. However, we face serious complications of the analysis
due to the many vintages of mortgages, issued at times when price levels and interest rates
were different. Moreover, many of these mortgages are paid off or defaulted and disappear
in response to changing economic conditions, allowing for such things as echo effects of
past interest rate or price changes. Moreover, we do not have data on all the vintages for a
geographical region such as a state.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to derive analytically the relation between average
foreclosures for a state and the city-wide price level Ct. However, some general principles
will emerge from the analysis here. First of all, we note that foreclosures will tend to be
determined by a sort of distributed lag on past price changes. The length of the distributed
lag depends on the vintages of mortgages whose mortgage balances have not been reduced
by amortization to the point that they are so far below prices that the put is in the near-zero
portion of the function f. Presumably, the distributed lag dies faster the higher the rate of
price increase. There do not need to be aggregate price declines for there to be foreclosures;
a period of five years or so of flat prices will tend to cause a burst of foreclosures, since
mortgage balances are not reduced much by amortization in the first five years, and five
years is enough time for a good number of houses to see their value drift downwards
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randomly due to the Hit term, such things as changing neighborhood characteristics. The
effect of other variables Xit such as the unemployment rate interacts with the effects of the
distributed lag of price changes: if prices have been rising smartly then there will be less
of an effect of other variables on foreclosures.
Each of the inputs to the strategy noted above: the loan-to-value ratios of the portfolio,
the metropolitan area price to neighborhood price betas and the default discounts can change
through time. Therefore an ideal hedging strategy would require the mortgage holder to
update its hedging analysis on a regular basis.

Mortgages and Home Prices: Methods of Dealing with Price Risk
Because of the non-linear relationship between actual losses (deficiencies) and house prices,
even regionally diversified mortgage portfolios are exposed to potentially catastrophic risk
from sharp regional price drops (this point will be discussed further below). Given the
experiences of Texas, New England and Alaska and the recent worries over California, the
increasing rush to shed risk is not surprising. First, there is increasing pressure for broader
and deeper private mortgage insurance. Agencies are offering reduced “guarantor fees” in
exchange for deep pool coverage when acquiring pools.
One way of dealing with mortgage risk is securitization, but securitization simply
transfers the risks directly to mortgage-backed securities holders. Non-agency investor
worries, particularly about California, have led to demands for mortgage-backed securities
credit enhancement via a “super-senior” structure. Classes of mortgage-backed securities
are set aside to bear any default losses ahead of more senior protected paper.
All of these complex methods of passing on default risk could be avoided if a hedging
vehicle were available.

Empirical Literature on Default Risk
There is no shortage of evidence on the importance of home prices and equity on the default
decision. Quercia and Stegman (1992) present a review of 29 empirical studies done over
a thirty year period. They conclude:
Consistently, home equity, or the related measure of loan to value ratio, has been
found to influence the default decision. There is a consensus in most recent default
studies that the correct measure of a borrower’s net equity is the contemporaneous
market value of property less the contemporaneous market value of the loan, a
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measure that also incorporates borrower expectations.4
Kau, Keenan and Kim (1991) reach the same conclusion:
There exists a significant literature examining causes of default. In conformity with
this paper’s approach, considerable empirical evidence exists showing that it is the
house versus the mortgage value, rather than such personal characteristics as the
homeowners liquidity position, that explains default.5
Even more recently, in a study using a discrete proportional hazard model, micro level
mortgage data from Freddie Mac and WRS (weighted repeat sales) price indexes, Quigley,
Van Order and Deng (1993) state:
The results show that the probability of negative equity ratio is the main time
varying covariate influencing mortgage holders’ default decision.6
The history of the mortgage industry provides dramatic evidence that default risk is
related in a non-linear way to housing prices. Losses from default depend not only on the
incidence of defaults, but on the severity of deficiencies after collateral liquidation.
Unfortunately, there are virtually no data on aggregate claims over time which are available
on a non-proprietary basis. But this is an area where history is well known. The catastrophic losses in recent years have been in Texas and other parts of the Southwest, in
Alaska, and in New England. In all three cases, housing prices dropped sharply. While the
number of defaults increased, actual losses soared. In other areas of the country, default
rates rise and fall with economic conditions, but actual deficiencies are kept to reasonable
levels by collateral values when real estate prices haven’t fallen.
This is a very important point in terms of the need for a hedging vehicle. If default risk
were randomly distributed across the country, a regionally diversified portfolio would be
sufficient to control the risks of default losses. But experience has shown that even
regionally diversified portfolios can suffer catastrophic losses when large regions of the
country suffer significant price declines.

4

Quercia and Stegman (1992), p. 357.

5

Kau, Keenan and Kim (1991), p. 8. The authors cite Jackson and Kaserman (1980), Foster and
Van Order (1984), Waller (1988), and Cunningham and Capone (1990).
6

Quigley, Van Order and Deng, 1993.
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House Prices and Default Risk: Additional Evidence
Recent years have seen dramatic swings in house prices. Nowhere have they been more
dramatic than in Massachusetts and in California. Figures 2 and 3 show the pattern of single
family home price movements in the Boston CMSA and in Los Angeles County.7 Between
1982 and 1988, home prices in Boston rose 177 percent. Following a gentle peak that lasted
two full years, prices dropped sharply in 1990, bottoming in January of 1992 down 18%.
Prices have since been on a gradual uptrend in Boston, an uptrend that has wiped out most
of the loss since the peak.
Similarly, housing prices in Los Angeles County boomed from 1986 to 1989 rising 92%.
Following a much sharper peak than in Massachusetts, prices began falling in 1990 and fell
26% by January 1994, followed by an apparent leveling off of the price decline starting with
early 1994. It is of course impossible to tell whether the appearance of firmer prices since
the beginning of 1994 is just a temporary interruption of the decline.
In Massachusetts, we calculated repeat sales price indexes for 64 separate geographical
areas made up of individual zip codes or zip code clusters. For each of the 64 areas, the
increase in price from 1982 (2nd quarter) to the peak was calculated as was the decline since
the peak (through June 1993). Nearly all jurisdictions peaked during the 2nd half of 1988
or the first half of 1989. Summary statistics for the 64 jurisdictions are given in Table 1.
The important point to be made here is that the variation in declines across areas is
larger than the variation in increases across the same areas. We have argued above that
during periods of price decline, losses are likely to increase in a non-linear way since both
the number of claims and severity increase when prices drop. Further, recall that in Figure
1 we argued that the likelihood of default increases in a non-linear fashion as the log loan
to value ratio rises. This implies that if the cross-area variance of the log price change
increases when prices drop, this would push clusters of properties into the category of
severely depressed, sharply increasing default probability and severity of deficiency.
This is exactly what happened in Massachusetts. Thirteen of the 64 areas experienced
declines of more than 20% since peak, virtually wiping out all equity for first time buyers
between 1987 and 1989. The worst three areas (Lowell -56%, Brockton –44% and Chelsea/
Revere –38%) are all large, severely impacted industrial areas with high rates of
unemployment. In these three areas more than half of all recorded sales are foreclosure
sales.

7

The indexes plotted in Figures 2 and 3 are repeat sales indexes following the method discussed
in Case and Shiller (1987, 1989) estimated from data on over 1.5 million sale pairs in Los Angeles and
over 85,000 sale pairs from the five eastern counties in Massachusetts.
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At the same time, 4 zip code clusters that include 13 towns show declines of 7% or less
during the same period.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of home price movements on default rates during the
boom/bust cycle in Massachusetts. Default rates are “total default inventory” obtained from
the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) National Delinquency Survey (quarterly). From
1982 through 1988, housing prices rose sharply, and default rates were pushed nearly to zero
as loan to value ratios increased. As soon as prices flattened and ultimately dropped, total
foreclosures rose sharply. Finally, as prices bottomed and stabilized, total foreclosures also
stabilized.
The data for California, presented in Figure 5, show a similar pattern but over a longer
time period. Sharp price increases during the first California boom from 1975 through 1980
pushed foreclosure rates down steadily to nearly 0.1%. The dislocation of the 1981/82
recession combined with stable prices in the early 1980's increased foreclosures to nearly
1%. The second California boom from 1986 through 1989 again decreased loan to value
ratios and foreclosure rates fell sharply. When prices turned around and began falling in
1990, foreclosure rates shot up and are still climbing.
Note that the plots in Figures 4 and 5 show total foreclosure inventory as a fraction of
total loan portfolios. A more accurate picture would be obtained by looking at foreclosure
rates by vintage year. The highest foreclosure rates are for mortgages written in California
in 1989 and 1990, while in Massachusetts the highest rates are for mortgages written in 1988
and 1989.

Regression Results
While the ideal data for studies of default incidence is micro data on individual seasoned
mortgages from which hazard models might be estimated, we decided to look at default and
foreclosure data from the MBA since 1975.
Three sets of regressions have been run. Table 2 presents the results when the log of the
MBA total foreclosure rate for the state is regressed on a distributed lag of the log difference
of the repeat sales indexes presented above. Since there is likely to be an autocorrelated
residual, the regressions are run using the Cochrane–Orcutt procedure to estimate the
residual autocorrelation coefficient rho.
In both Los Angeles and Massachusetts, the set of lagged price changes explains a
substantial portion of the overall variation in foreclosure. In the Massachusetts equation the
adjusted R2 is .87 while in the Los Angeles equation it is .94.
While extraordinary default risk is created when substantial periods of boom are
followed by a sharp downturn as was the case in California and in New England, what
10

portion of the variation in default and foreclosure nationally can be explained by collateral
depreciation?
To estimate the role of home prices on foreclosure rates across all states we have
assembled a data base containing a number of state level economic variables quarterly since
1975 as well as default and foreclosure data from the MBA. Table 3 presents the results of
a simple model of foreclosure rates, a time series-cross section regression where each
observation of the dependent variable is a state in a given quarter. We use 2,603 observations of these state-quarter foreclosure rates; note that start dates for various series differ
across states. The ordinary least squares regression includes a simple dummy variable for
quarters when available data suggest significant declines home prices. Such declines have
occurred in 10 states in four areas: the Southeast during the mid-1980s, the Northeast and
California during the early 1990s, and Alaska during the late 1980s.
The most significant variables are per capita net migration for the state lagged one year
and the “bust” dummy. Both have the anticipated signs. The average unemployment rate
over the last 8 quarters is highly significant with the expected sign. The level of per capita
income has the wrong sign, but the change in per capita income has the expected sign.
Finally, we have incorporated the distributed lags that were found to be so predictive
in Table 2 for Massachusetts and Los Angeles into the time-series cross-section analysis for
the 50 states. Doing this enables us to make use of data on all fifty states, to see whether
distributed lags are really predictive of foreclosures in a wide variety of settings. Table 4
presents the results of the time-series cross-section model estimated with the same data base,
this time using the Hildreth–Lu method to control for autocorrelation within individual
states and fixed effects to control for differences across states. The log of the total foreclosure rate is regressed on distributed lags on changes in the National Association of
Realtors’ median home prices for the state and on the ratio of real per capita personal
income in the state the quarter to its level four quarters earlier. The constant term and the
coefficients of the state dummies are not shown in the table. Because of the sixteen-quarter
distributed lag on changes in per capita personal income and the twelve-quarter distributed
lag on house price changes (as well as the problem that start dates for some series are later
for some states), the number of observations is reduced to 914. Even though the distributed
lag coefficients were unconstrained (no polynomial or other functional relationship having
been imposed) all of the price coefficients are negative, as we would expect; they are almost
always significant at conventional levels, and the model explains 86 percent of the variation
in foreclosures over the period. The peak effect of price changes on foreclosure occurs at
a lag of about two years.
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Conclusion and Further Research
The purpose of this paper was to add information relevant to the argument presented in
Case, Shiller and Weiss (1993) calling for establishment of index-based futures and options
markets in real estate for a variety of cities. The largest single group that would benefit
from the ability to hedge in such markets is homeowners, who are generally underdiversified
and highly leveraged. Unfortunately, homeowners are not well informed about the use of
derivatives to reduce risk; thus, use of such markets would be likely to evolve over a long
period of time as insurance and financial service companies develop consumer products to
take advantage of the new markets.
The real issue is, what other groups stand to gain from the establishment of real estate
futures and options markets that would have the requisite knowledge to use appropriate
hedging to reduce risk? One obvious example is the group of mortgage holders or those who
currently “own” the default risk associated with mortgages (i.e. private mortgage insurers
or mortgage-backed securities holders).
Mortgage holders face risks from interest rate increases, prepayments and from default
and foreclosure. Interest rate risk and prepayment risk can be hedged easily in interest rate
futures and options markets, but foreclosure risk is uncorrelated with any existing hedging
vehicle.
The empirical part of the paper presented evidence that home prices do indeed predict
foreclosure, and that a set of derivative products based on regional price movements would
provide an appropriate vehicle for hedging default risk.
Table 1
Price Increases and Decreases: 64 Areas in Massachusetts
1982–Peak

Peak–1993

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Standard Deviation
Coefficient of Variation

136%
235%
170%
21%
0.12

–2%
–56%
–17%
8%
0.50

1st Quartile
3rd Quartile

156%
182%

–13%
–19%
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Table 2
Distributed Lag Regressions: Massachusetts and Los Angeles
Massachusetts: 1985:3–1991:4 Quarterly
Dependent Variable: LFTt (Log of total MBA foreclosure rate for Massachusetts)
Independent variables: DPt = Log Pricet – Log Pricet–1
Price = Case Shiller Home Price Index for Massachusetts
Method: Cochrane–Orcutt; N = 26
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Constant
DPt–1
DPt–2
DPt–3
DPt–4
DPt–5
DPt–6
DPt–7
DPt–8
DPt–9
DPt–10
DPt–11
DPt–12
RHO
R̄2 = .870

–.205
0.732
–3.605
–3.362
–0.977
–11.065
7.891
2.263
–9.016
–2.121
–7.863
–7.594
2.876
0.425

–0.948
0.153
–0.758
–0.486
–0.133
–1.352
–0.994
–0.283
–1.134
–0.310
–1.117
–1.218
0.497
1.531

Los Angeles: 1978:3–1991:4 Quarterly
Dependent Variable: LFTt (Log of total MBA foreclosure rate for California)
Independent variables: DPt = Log Pricet – Log Pricet–1
Price = Case Shiller Home Price Index for Los Angeles County
Method: Cochrane–Orcutt; N = 54
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Constant
DPt–1
DPt–2
DPt–3
DPt–4
DPt–5
DPt–6
DPt–7
DPt–8
DPt–9
DPt–10
DPt–11
DPt–12
RHO
R̄2 = .943

–0.042
0.005
0.248
–0.568
–2.506
–2.580
–1.674
–1.714
–1.683
–2.821
–3.456
–2.064
–1.330
0.886

–0.197
0.005
0.228
–0.503
–2.204
–2.311
–1.506
–1.538
–1.427
–2.392
–2.881
–1.771
–1.300
13.184
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Table 3
Time-Series Cross-Section Regressions
Fifty States, quarterly data, 1975:1–1993:1. Start dates for series differ across states.
Dependent Variable: FTt (total MBA foreclosure rate in state)
Independent Variables:
Unemp Average unemployment rate in state over the last 8 quarters
Per capita personal income in the state lagged 4 quarters
PCYt-4
ChPCY Change in log per capita personal income in the state over the last 4 quarters
PCNMt–4 Per capita net migration for the state lagged 4 quarters
Natfort National foreclosure rate
BUSTt Dummy variable for quarters in which nominal home prices fell significantly in
AK,
CT, MA, NH, NY, NJ, CAL, TX, OK, RI
Method: Ordinary Least Squares
N = 2,603
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Constant
Unemp
PCYt–4
ChPCY
PCNMt–4
Natfort
BUST
R̄2 = .297

2.725
0.048
0.027
–1.582
–24.421
1.141
1.277

5.589
6.545
4.131
–3.437
–18.417
7.780
17.283

14

Table 4
Time-Series Cross-Section Distributed Lag Regressions
Fifty States, quarterly data, 1975:1–1993:1. Start dates for series differ across states.
Dependent Variable: LFTt (log total MBA foreclosure rate in state)
Independent Variables:
Unemp Average unemployment rate in state over the last 8 quarters
DPYt PCYt/PCYt-4, Ratio in state of real per capita personal income to real per capita
personal income 4 quarters ago
Pricet – Pricet–1
DPt
Price NAR Median Price of Existing Single Family Homes
Method: Hildreth–Lu with fixed effects for states.
N = 914
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Unemp
DPYt–1
DPYt–2
DPYt–3
DPYt–4
DPYt–5
DPYt–6
DPYt–7
DPYt–8
DPYt–9
DPYt–10
DPYt–11
DPYt–12
DPYt–13
DPYt–14
DPYt–15
DPYt–16
DPt–1
DPt–2
DPt–3
DPt–4
DPt–5
DPt–6
DPt–7
DPt–8
DPt–9
DPt–10
DPt–11
DPt–12
R̄2 =.857

0.266
–4.515
–1.376
0.298
0.658
–0.193
1.051
3.747
3.640
–1.092
0.752
3.018
1.386
1.908
0.683
0.445
2.940
–0.017
–0.023
–0.030
–0.037
–0.040
–0.045
–0.049
–0.049
–0.043
–0.032
–0.018
–0.005

3.297
–3.073
–0.965
0.213
-.460
–0.117
0.631
2.211
2.147
–0.683
0.477
1.885
0.882
1.381
0.507
0.314
2.031
–3.253
–2.496
–2.550
–2.747
–2.833
–3.230
–3.728
–4.125
–4.121
–3.761
–2.938
–1.535
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Figure 1. Hypothetical example of the function f relating probability of foreclosure to natural log
of loan-to-value ratio.
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Figure 2. Case Shiller Monthly Home Price Index, 1982-1 to 1994-12, 1990-1 = 100, Greater Boston.
Source: Case Shiller Weiss, Inc.
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Figure 3. Case Shiller Monthly Home Price Index, 1971-1 to 1994-12, 1990-1 = 100, Los Angeles County.
Source: Case Shiller Weiss, Inc.
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Figure 4. Total foreclosures Massachusetts in percent, dashed line, and Case Shiller Massachusetts
Home Price Index, as fraction of base value, solid line, quarterly, 1982-1 to 1993-1.
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association and Case Shiller Weiss, Inc.
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Figure 5. Total foreclosures California in percent, dashed line, and Case Shiller Los Angeles Home
Price Index as fraction of base value, solid line, quarterly, 1982-1 to 1992-4.
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association and Case Shiller Weiss, Inc.
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